The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and the only international court that has general subject matter jurisdiction over disputes between all of the members of the United Nations, virtually every state in the world. 2 The ICJ has considerable importance, both political and scholarly. Many of the ICJ's judgments appear to have resolved real international disputes. And although in many other cases states have failed to comply with its judgments, or to acknowledge its jurisdiction, the ICJ remains a potent symbol of the possibilities of an international legal system. For its defenders, the ICJ "plays the leading role in legitimating the [international legal] system by resolving its disputes in a principled manner." 3 Critics of the ICJmainly politicians and diplomats from states that have recently lost their cases-argue that the ICJ's rulings are politically motivated. 4 In the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the ICJ is a "semi-legal, se etimes accept and sometimes don't." 5 The ICJ is also of intrinsic scholarly in ics, even those who do not study international law. It is, after all, a court, and resembles domestic courts in e United States and other countries. A large literature debates judicial voting in domest applica in the d study o domest s. We test the claim f the critics that the judges vote the interest of the state that appoints them rather than gally irrelevant considerations such as whether one party has a military alliance related to legally irrelevant factors. The null hypothesis implies that an unbiased judge mi-juridical, semi-political body which nations som terest for legal academ th ic courts, focusing on whether judges' decisions reflect ideology or disinterested tion of the conventions of legal reasoning. 6 The academic discussion has a parallel ispute about whether the voting of ICJ judges reflects national interests or not. A f the voting patterns of ICJ judges might be of interest for those who study ic judicial decisionmaking.
This paper examines data on the voting patterns of ICJ judge o enforcing international law in a disinterested way. The null hypothesis, then, is that judges are "unbiased." A judge votes in an unbiased way if he or she is influenced only by the relevant legal considerations-such as the proper interpretation of a treaty-and not by le with the judge's state. The ideal way to determine whether a judge is unbiased, is just to figure out the proper legal outcome of a dispute and then see whether his or her vote matches that outcome, taking account legitimate differences in the legal cultures in which judges are educated. The problem with this approach, however, is that the proper legal outcome is rarely obvious, and, further, judges may make mistakes and vote the wrong way even though they are unbiased.
To avoid this problem, we can look at voting patterns alone and see if they are from state X is no more likely to vote for state X than is an unbiased judge from state Y.
The unbiased judge from state X is also no more likely to vote for state Z, where Z is an ally of X, than an unbiased judge from state Y, where Z is an enemy of Y. We are thus 4 See also Robinson (2003) . For some expressions of skepticism by international lawyers, see Reisman (1995) , Chayes and Chayes (1995) . 5 See Freepedia, Nicaragua v. U.S., available at: http://en.freepedia.org/Nicaragua_v._United_States.html. 6 See Segal & Spaeth (1993); Epstein & Knight (1998) ; Bergara et al. (2003) .
not assuming that unbiased judges always vote the same way-as there can be legitimate, legally relevant grounds for disagreeing on the outcome of a dispute-but only that their disagreements are random (or correlated with relevant legal factors), and not correlated s to 85-90 percent when the party is the judge's home ate.
ing certain periods than do others, and that in rare viet and Syrian judges, they have always voted the with political factors.
The simplest way to test this claim is to examine whether judges vote in favor of their home state when that state appears as a party. Previous studies have found some support for this claim, but have also disputed the significance of this finding. 7 We use more sophisticated empirical tests, as well as more data, to show that, in fact, judges are significantly biased in favor of their home state when that state appears as a party.
Whereas judges vote in favor of a party about 50 percent of the time when they have no relationship with it, that figure rise st This finding has limited importance, however, because it does not tell us anything about the voting behavior of judges when their home state is not a party. It is possible that only the judges whose home states are parties are biased, in which case their votes cancel out, leaving 13 or so other judges to resolve the case impartially. We hypothesize that even when a judge's home state is not a party, his home state may have an interest in one party prevailing, and that the judge's vote will reflect his state's interest. Previous studies have found no evidence for this hypothesis. The most recent such study concluded:
[T]he record does not reveal significant [voting] alignments, either on a regional, political, or economic basis. There is a high degree of consensus among the judges on most decisions. The most that can be discerned is that some judges vote more frequently together dur instances, notably with the So same way. But there have not been persistent voting alignments which have significantly affected the decisions of the Court. (Weiss 1987, 134) However, this study and the earlier studies all have flaws; chiefly, the failure to rely on statistical techniques that control for relevant factors.
o "not support the theoretical contention that the system of national 7 For example, Suh (1969, 230) found that judges vote in favor of their government in 82 percent of the cases, but concluded that his data d judges must necessarily be out of harmony with international justice." See also Hensley (1968) ; Samore (1956) ; Weiss (1987) .
To test our hypothesis, we classify states into blocs-based on region, wealth, culture, military and political alliances, and similar factors-so that we can determine whether judges are biased in favor of state parties that belong to the same bloc as the judges' home state. We find substantial evidence for this hypothesis.
rly 1930s issued about two judgments on contentious cases per year. However, it
The ICJ is based on the statute of the International Court of Justice, which is cases authorized by a treaty that provides that future disputes arising under the treaty will be adjudicated by the ICJ; and (iii) cases between states that have declared themselves
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides some background, including the history of the ICJ and a brief discussion of the political and academic debates about the ICJ. Part II provides our hypotheses. Part III describes the data and tests the hypotheses.
I. Background
The ICJ is not the first world court; it is the successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The PCIJ began operations in 1922, and at its peak in the late 1920s
and ea gradually lost relevance for governments beset by the problems created by the worldwide depression and the rise of fascism. By the late 1930s the PCIJ, like the League of Nations, had become irrelevant and it was not used at all during World War II.
The founders of the United Nations resurrected the PCIJ, albeit with a new name, in the hope that a world court would operate more successfully if backed by the United Nations, which was designed to be a stronger institution than the League of Nations and enjoyed the participation and leadership of the United States. dent of, but referenced by, the United Nations charter. All members of the United charter are parties to the statute, so virtually every state has been, from the ICJ's g, subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The statute of the ICJ is a vague nt, and has been supplemented over the years with other agreements, internal rders, and customs. c The ICJ has jurisdiction over three types of cases: (i) cases by "special agreement," where the parties to a dispute agree to subject to the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the court. proceedings, one or both of the parties used an ad hoc judge.
The history of the ICJ can be seen as a struggle between the internationalist aspirations of the court's s 8 The distribution is not formally recorded, but is the custom (Rosenne (1995)). There is no official list of the countries in each region, which is a problem for our coding, especially as this ambiguity is sometimes exploited:
In 1999, for example, Jordan was suddenly considered as an Asian country while it had been considered as an African country until then. Judge Al-Khasawneh from Jordan was accordingly able to succeed Judge Weeramantry from Sri Lanka. Email from Laurence Blairon, Information Officer for the International Court of Justice, to Wayne Hsiung (July 12, 2004). 9 China did not have a judge from 1967 to1985.
obligations. Consider the bases of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction by special agreement poses no threat to states because they can avoid it simply by refusing to consent to jurisdiction. of the benefits of the treaty, and, as ICJ jurisdiction is always recipro gua case (discussed below), permanent member of the security council remains subject to compulsory jurisdiction were d
The ICJ, in special agreement cases, serves as an elaborate arbitration device. To be sure, unlike traditional arbitration, the state parties that use the ICJ do not select most of the judges, so that the ICJ, unlike traditional arbitration panels, may be willing to decide cases in a way that reflects the interests of states other than the two parties. But for just this reason states may use traditional arbitration rather than the ICJ, if they wish.
Next we have treaty-based jurisdiction. Here, state consent is also needed-at the time that the treaty is ratified-so in theory states have nothing to fear from treaty-based jurisdiction. But in practice states sometimes must agree to ICJ resolution of treaty disputes if they want any cal, states agree to ICJ jurisdiction so that they have the power to bring other states to court. These states can then find themselves pulled before the ICJ against their will, often many years after the treaty was ratified.
Finally, we have compulsory jurisdiction. Again, states can avoid compulsory jurisdiction by not filing a declaration. But many states have filed this declaration, apparently because they believe the benefit-being able to pull another state before the ICJ-exceeds the costs-being pulled before the ICJ by another state. Note that the obligation is strictly reciprocal: a state can be pulled before the ICJ only by another state that has itself filed the declaration. In addition, most states have, through reservations, consented to compulsory jurisdiction only for a narrow range of cases. The US's declaration, for example, excluded cases involving national security. When the ICJ nonetheless found that this clause was satisfied in the Nicara the U.S. pulled out of compulsory jurisdiction. France also withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction after the ICJ took a case without France's consent in the early 1970s. No except the UK.
One hundred and four cases have been filed with the ICJ; about a quarter of these ropped before the ICJ was able to make a substantive decision. In 76 cases, the ICJ judges voted on substantive questions. 10 The most common type of case involved a border dispute (31), followed by use of force (22) As the number of UN members has tripled over this period, it seems clear that the ICJ has become less popular, but it is not clear why. itted to the development of international law, or think that
ICJ judges vote in favor of the country that
ties. We expect that their votes will cancel evidence that the appointment of judges is a highly political process. States may try to appoint judges who are already inclined to advance the national interest.
It is not the purpose of this paper to decide which of these explanations, if any, are true. 20 We are concerned with the question whether these factors or some other factors cause judges to vote in favor of the interests of the state that appoints them. 21 The contrary view-the null hypothesis-is that judges take their legal role seriously because they are ideologically comm they are more likely to be rewarded for impartiality than for bias, or are not selected on the basis of national bias.
The simplest hypothesis is that appointed them when that country is a party to the case. Thus, if the applicant is the U.S., and the judge is an American, then the judge will vote in favor of the applicant. If the respondent is Nigeria, and the judge is an ad hoc appointee of Nigeria (whether he or she is Nigerian or not), then the judge will vote in favor of the respondent.
This first hypothesis is simple and easily tested, but it does not resolve the main question, which is whether the ICJ, as a court, is biased. For the normal two party case, 19 See Rosenne (1995). 20 Our data set is not rich enough to allow us to do this; for some speculation about these issues, see . 21 The literature on domestic courts makes naïve judge votes his ideology, and a a distinction between naïve and sophisticated voting -where a sophisticated judge takes account of the possible responses of attitudes of other states or international organizations. Thus, the judges are sophisticated, but their incentives are national, not international. Future research might consider the possibility that judges seek to ate the court, and for that reason would sometimes vote against the interests of their ropean Court of Justice (see Alter 1998, Gibson & Caldeira Congress and so may suppress his ideological instincts when doing so would elicit a negative reaction from Congress. We do not take into account the possibility that states or international institutions might respond to ICJ judgments by overturning them or ignoring them, though the latter does happen. Our working hypothesis is that judges care more about their own government's and state's attitudes toward them than the strengthen and legitim own states. A stream of literature on the Eu 1995) argues that judges of the ECJ vote impartially in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the court. Unfortunately, ECJ votes are not public, so we cannot test this hypothesis using the method advanced in this paper.
Region. UN General Assembly voting often divides along regional lines, and
the ICJ has region-based representation. Accordingly, we predict regional alignments.
We will focus on continental alignments (North America, South America, Africa, r trade. Thus, we predict that judges from wealthier countries will fav interests, and are ore l ith the same language and religion as the judge's home state.
riables might, in fact, be better proxies for political alignments, Europe, Asia 23 We thus test the hypothesis that judges from democracies are more likely to favor democracies; we also look at whether judges from nondemocracies are more likely to favor nondemocracies.
5. Culture. Judges might be biased in favor of states for which they have a cultural affinity. As proxies for culture, we use majority language and religion: judges are more likely to vote for states w
Note that these va especially postcolonial alignments.
6. UN organization. We look at whether judges from states that are permanent members of the security council are more likely to vote for permanent members of the security council. 22 The regional representation on the ICJ is not quite the same, but alternative coding does not produce results that are appreciably different. 
III. Data

A. Approach
The case reports include a majority opinion, plus concurring and dissenting pinions when they exist. The reports also show a vote tally for each issue that is decided.
sue by reading all the opinions. Later reports give the vote tally and also reveal the way e test asks whether a judge voted in favor of an applicant or a respondent for particular issue. We used both approaches, but only report our analysis and results for ilar. The advantage of the issue-by-issue approach is that there are more data. A single se may have as many as 10 issues, and the judges may vote differently by issue. The problem with the ounts each issue equally. But a judge who votes in favor of the applicant on nine jurisdictional issues, and in favor of the respondent on one jurisdictional issue, is, as a practical se where he votes in favor of the applicant on the first of two issues hat the special agreement cases do not technically involve an applicant and respondent, because they are brought jointly by the two parties. In these cases, the words "applicant" and "respondent" are just placeholders and should be read as "one party or the other." Nothing in the analysis turns on the identity of a party as an applican 25 The results are sim ca issue-by-issue approach is that it c matter, voting against the applicant. It is not clear that such a judge should be considered predominantly pro-applicant, or more so than in a ca and the respondent on the second. Before we turn to the data, we should discuss selection effects. We already mentioned one kind of selection effect: governments might appoint judges who are impartial-in the sense that they vote according to legal principles-but happen to hold an idiosyncratic view of the world that favors the legal principles that will end up helping the appointing state in any ICJ litigation. On this view, the ICJ may be biased as an institution ev the institution as a whole, and less interested in the motivations of the judges, this selection effect does not undermine our empirical analysis. We do note, however, that it is unlikely that jurisprudence could be so elastic that a judge could always vote in good faith in favor of his own country.
A more troublesome possible selection effect could occur at the filing stage rather than the appointment stage. Suppose that states file cases with the ICJ only when they predict that the judges will favor them. As a result, the pool of observations does not contain those cases where (say) a judge votes against his home state, and our regression 28 We do not report regressions using these controls either because they make no difference or because they 31 Table 1 provides our data. 
Nonparty Judges
We attempt to measure the biases of nonparty judges by looking for links between their state and the state parties. We hypothesize that nonparty judges are more likely to vote in favor of states that belong to a geopolitical bloc shared by their own state. Table 2 reports results for voting by bloc or alignment. e: cells provi age of vot cant by a stat hes t or respondent along the relevant dimension, and number of observations. We exclude cases where the applicant and the respondent share the characteristic in question (except in the last row), and cases where the judge's home state is a party (or the judge is an ad hoc).
The table provides support for the hypothesis of bloc voting. When the judge's state and one party match-both are members of NATO, EU, OECD, or they share language or religion-and the other party does not, the judge is more likely to vote for the matchin 6 (a These results are especially strong for language and religion. Regional alignments and security council membership seem to be irrelevant, however. The last two rows provide a ge of votes for the applicant when the pplicant and the judge both belong to the EU is less than 50 percent, but this may be attributable to fa Figure 2 shows the relationship between w ent and the probability of a judge favoring the applicant. . A high value means that the democracy score for the judge's state is close to the democracy score of the applicant. 34 We use data from Polity IV. The figure shows the predicted relationship. Judges from democratic states favor riables.
democracies over nondemocracies, and judges from nondemocratic states favor nondemocracies over democracies.
C. Results
So far we have limited ourselves to the raw data. The raw data are suggestive but of limited value. In this section, we report the results of several regressions. The main obstacle for our regressions is multicollinearity: wealth, democracy, language, religion, and the various regional groupings are all, to some extent, related-in some cases, with correlations as high as 0.5. 35 To address this problem, we run several regressions with different groups of independent va 35 Another problem is that we run probit regressions and almost all of our independent variables are categorical variables. This creates statistical problems that we acknowledge but have no remedy for. We do note that one of our independent variables -the wealth measure -is continuous and significant in most of the regressions.
We use a Tables 3 and 4 report two sets of these regressions. Table 3 contains the results of regressions without fixed effects; Table 4 contains the results of regressions with judge and case fixed effects.
The tables contain the standardized coefficients (the marginal probability calculated at the mean), the standard errors (in parenthesis), and the value of the z-statistic for each of the variables. that its main practical drawbacks include obtaining ives and the difficulty in obtaining partial effects on the response probabilities, which involve complex calculation. Chamberlain suggests that a probit with two-way fixed effects can present a number of statistical irregularities. To address these concerns, we test nd we reran our regressions holding the sample constant and find consistent results.
our data with conditional logit models, and find that the results do not have any substantive impact. These results are available from the authors. 37 We also run a series of regressions at the issue level. We find that the results are similar to those presented here. A 24 The co k the safest conclusion is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that judges are not biased by NATO and regional matches. perhaps some countries are more or less likely to be the subject of bias because they are generally considered good (Sweden) or bad (Libya) world citizens.
We tested all these possibilities and will not burden the reader with our results. 42 It is sufficient to say that our main results-for applicant and respondent match, for democracy, for wealth, and (somewhat weaker) fo ntrols themselves do not appear to be important. 43 What do these numbers mean? Are the biases we identify trivial or important?
As we have seen, a judge whose home state does not share a relevant characteristic with either the applicant or respondent votes in favor of the applicant with a 41 Another possible measure of strategic alignment is trade: it is possible that a judge from a state with good trading relations with a party would be more likely to vote for that party. We tried to test this hypothesis using data on trade flows, but because the data are relatively recent (post-1962) and partial (excluding many states), we don't have much confidence in regressions. Simple correlations suggest a positive voting for the applicant and the ositive relationship
War voting in the General Assembly shows an East-West cleavage similar to that which relationship between a vote for the applicant and variables that measure the relative strength of the trading relationship between the judge's state and the applicant. There is a positive relationship, for example, between the probability of voting for the applicant and the sum of exports and imports between the judge's state and the applicant; a negative relationship between the probability of sum of exports and imports between the judge's state and the respondent; and a p between the probability of voting for the applicant and the ratio of exports and imports with applicant over exports and imports with respondent (both weighted for judge's state's GDP and not). Most of these relationships are significant at the 10 percent level but not all of them are. 42 Available from authors. We did not use case or judge fixed effects because of data limitations. We also reran the regressions after dropping all cases involving interveners, multiple applicants, and multiple respondents; doing this changes our results only trivially. 43 Except that the results are somewhat stronger for the Cold War. But there are not enough post-Cold War cases for us to determine whether bias has significantly weakened since then. As Voeten (2000, 213) found that post-Cold prevailed during the Cold War, we should be cautious about assuming that the ICJ voting would be different. by the about same amount. As the democracy variable increases from its minimum to its maximum, the likelihood of a judge favoring the applicant increases by 25 percentage points. As it increases one standard deviation around the median, the likelihood of favoring the applicant increases by 7 percentage points. As the GDP per capita variable increases from its minimum to its maximum, the probability that the judge favors the applicant increases by 32 percentage points. As it increases one standard deviation around the median, the likelihood increases by 5 percentage points. The probability of a judge voting in favor of the applicant increases by 24 percentage po tate's language is the same as the applicant, compared to the case of no match. But the probability is virtually unchanged when the language match is with the respondent.
The bottom line on the regressions is clear. Judges are biased in favor of their own countries, and in favor of countries that match the econ m eakly) cultural attributes of their own. As for regional and military groupings r economic or strategic-we are hampered by multicollinearity and lack of variation. 44 The data suggest that national bias has an important influence on the decisionmaking of the ICJ. Judges vote for their home states about 90 percent of the time.
When their home states are not involved, judges vote for states that are similar to their home states-along the dimensions of wealth, culture, and political regime. Judges also may favor the strategic partners of their home states, but here the evidence is weaker because of multicollinearity; if they do, the magnitude of the bias is probably low.
We have not shown in a straightforward way that judges are consciously biased.
All that we have shown is that the judges, on t 44 As an additional test of our results, we did an in-sample prediction on our probit regression that included every variable. We found that our regression coefficients accurately predicted case outcomes 69 percent of the time.
manner prescribed by the null hypothesis. The motivation for their vote may be psychological or cultural; the judges do not necessarily consciously choose to favor a state that is strategically aligned with the judges' own state.
The evidence also does not prove that the ICJ is dysfunctional, though it gives one pause. For one thing, judges may vote dispassionately when the applicant and respondent are both very similar to their own state; they may also vote dispassionately when the applicant and respondent are both very different from their own state. In these cases, there is no reason for the judges to be biased, although they may be outvoted by judges who are biased. How often such cases arise is hard to say. The founders of the ICJ did anticipate the problem of judicial bias. Some people thought that judges should not be allowed to hear cases involving their home ly because they feared that such judges could not decide the cases impartially; for the same reason, the ad hoc system was anathema. Our evidence vindicates the premise 45 But for doubts, see .
of these critics but not their remedy. For our evidence suggests that even nonparty judges would be influenced by legally irrelevant factors.
The designers themselves appeared to think that party judges would ensure that each state would get a fair hearing during deliberations. It is certainly possible that judges could not be made to understand the claims of a state whose perspective they do not share, unless one of their number was a national or representative of that state. Our evidence does not reveal whether the cases were decided more impartially than they would have been if party judges had been prohibited.
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources
Our data set consists of all cases for which there was an opinion on a preliminary objectio observation was dropped.
Some cases involved multiple proceedings with separate votes (for example, on a preliminary objection and then on the merits). In the reported regressions, we generally used the latest proceeding unless it seemed minor (like an interpretive case); but we reran our regressions using all the proceedings, and the results differ only trivially. 
